This article investigates how firms exploit various forms of intellectual property (IP), often at the same time, in order to organize their strategic value seeking. The analysis is based upon confidential micro-data involving a survey of a set of 38 firms in the 
Introduction
It is now recognized that firms do not patent or copyright primarily to recover R&D expenditures, as suggested by mainstream intellectual property rights theory, but that their incentives are related to various types of strategic value they can obtain through licensing markets or via buying and selling of such rights (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986 ). Nonetheless, not many studies are specifically aimed at shedding light on how firms use different forms of IP markets and IP governance forms for strategic purposes. The present article makes a contribution towards filling this analytical and evidence-based gap. In doing so, we address a range of limitations in existing research contributions. Mainly, such limitations concern: the range of IP mechanisms considered, which is usually limited to patents and other formally registered intellectual property rights such as trademarks and copyright; the level of detail at which such mechanisms are considered for strategic value seeking, which rarely extends to the micro-analysis of the specific IP governance forms applied in IP transactions; and the lack of investigations into the 'types' of strategic benefits that firms seek when using these mechanisms.
The information and communication technology (ICT) sector is interesting to research in this respect. This is because firms in this sector today utilize or experiment with a variety of IP protection mechanisms, including both proprietary IP (patents, copyrights) and non-proprietary IP (open source, IP with no formal protection) 1 . The extent to which IP policy should embrace non-proprietary IP in the ICT sector, or it should instead mainly focus on extending laws and regulation for proprietary IP such as patents, has been intensively discussed for some time -for example, by the EU software hearing in the European Parliament in Brussels 2002 -2005 , IBM (2006 , and by the current OECD Working Party for SME and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE2) 2010-11. Understanding the extent to which firms exploit different forms of IP and the strategic objectives that underpin the choice to exploit each of these forms, is crucial in order to inform policymaking in the context of a rapidly changing industry such as ICT.
There are also other arguments for researching strategic value seeking from IP in this sector more fully. First, this sector is very important to most economies, including the UK's. In general, ICT has been considered the key driver of economic growth since at least the 1980s (Freeman and Perez, 1988) ; recent data from the UK Innovation Survey (Robson and Haigh, 2008) confirm that a large component (more than 50%) of all UK firms' innovation activities consist in acquisition of products from the ICT sector such as software and computer hardware. Second, it is a sector where intellectual assets are particularly important components of firm value and where their acquisition is often crucial for innovation to take place (Cockburn, 2007) .
Third, the sector has seen an increase of activity in IP transactions (for example, see Grindley and Teece, 2008 , on the increase of licensing and non-licensing agreements in the computer industry). One of the reasons for this perceived increase is due to the high level of disintegration of ICT modules in the production of products and components, especially software. Such activities in fact involve cumulative and incremental processes where different modules need to be combined into more complex systems (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001 ) to create commercially desirable products. The complex technologies underpinning the ICT industry and the challenge of short product life-cycles mean that firms are inclined to become involved in IP transactions, especially because product innovation in the ICT sector is very closely tied to time. Moreover, many ICT firms, especially software firms, have limited investment in downstream commercialisation capabilities, and usually choose to license to bigger software firms (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001) : the use of IP gives them a platform to be more competitive.
Aim and evidence base
The particular aim of this article is to show how ICT firms based in the UK engage in various IP transactions within both proprietary (patent and copyright) and nonproprietary (open source and no protection) IP markets, in order to realize strategic corporate value, related to financial gain, competitive positioning, innovation and strategic alliances or relationships. The roles played, in this value seeking process, by different IP governance forms (such as various forms of licensing arrangements, etc.) are also investigated. The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the general analytical framework and describes the research questions. Section 3 introduces the data on which the analysis is based. In Section 4 we present the analysis and discuss the results. Section 5 concludes on the organization of strategic value seeking from
proprietary and non-proprietary IP.
IP markets, IP governance and strategic value seeking
Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) It is important to note software inventions are protected differently internationally: in Europe and Japan, a piece of software can be patent-protected if it reflects a technical advancement. In this sense, it is protected as computer programs (criteria: the software idea has to be new and inventive or novel and non-obvious). In the USA, a piece of software can be patent-protected as long as it is 'in the technological arts': that is, the software may not necessarily be of technical character, but it needs to be implemented via computers to get the protection. In this sense, it is protected as business methods. This meets UN's definition of technology: 'a combination of equipment and knowledge'. (Criteria: the software idea has to be useful, concrete and tangible results has to be provided) 4 The database was developed as part of Work Package 3. ; Gans and Stern, 2000) and enhance innovation processes, often in a social process of interaction with other individuals and organizations, and thereby also enable the development of better technology or enable standardization and technological compatibility (see e.g. Merges and Nelson 1990, 1994; Winter 1993; Plant 1934) . Arora et al (2001) suggest that IP exchange in the ICT sector has proved in many cases to be a powerful instrument for codifying knowledge and technologies.
In fact, in order for IP to be transferred easily to other organisations, firms are encouraged to develop standard architectures and software components. This in turn will encourage more innovation from individuals or companies.
(ii) Benefits relating to market positioning and competitiveness, linked to the ability to gain or maintain market share due to the exclusive access to certain IP (see e.g. Rivette and Kline 2000; Cohen et al. 2000; Granstrand 1999 ).
(iii) Benefits relating to financial gain in terms of ability to derive income from transactions in IP markets, or conversely to cut costs by forsaking IP protection, or entering cross-licensing agreements, and even in terms of increased ability to raise capital thanks to the reporting of IP as strategic assets (see e.g. Coriat and Orsi 2002; Rivette and Kline 2000) .
(iv) Benefits relating to the building of strategic alliances or relationships with or within industry (see e.g. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993; Teece 1986 ).
Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) suggest that also the choice of the specific governance forms through which IP is transferred or acquired depends upon the type of financial and non-financial value that the stakeholders seek to realize: in other words, they suggest that there is a relationship between the choice of a certain IP governance form, for a specific type of IP, and the strategic benefits that firms seek to obtain from the transaction. For example, Mann (2005) highlighted in his research that some firms in the software industry obtain substantial amount of revenue through licensing, which confers direct income. Arora et al (2001) show that software firms have different competitive strategies, as many of them focus only on licensing their technology instead of investing into the business where their technologies are used.
We expect ICT firms to seek to realize specific types of value from the choice of specific IP governance forms, and we investigate this by exploring (in section 4.2)
whether there is a relationship between benefit-seeking and the choice of IP governance forms.
Data
The research is based upon structured (questionnaire-based) interviews with a set of 38 ICT firms in the UK. The firms have been extracted from the overall population of firms based in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with one or more employees, active in the ICT sector (their sector of activity was identified by NACE codes 7 ). According to the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database, the total number of firms operating under the selected NACE codes is 959 8 .
The subset of firms interviewed are representative of the overall population in terms of number of employees and turnover (the two variables are strongly correlated). The distribution of these variables is shown in Table 1 . The median respondent (at 50% percentile) is a firm with 74 employees and latest turnover of 8,979,116 GBP, localized in England and active in the field of software publishing. If we consider the distribution of firms by code of economic activity, response rates are quite similar across groups (3.3% for firms active in software publishing, 4.1% for firms active in hardware production, and 5.8% for firms with other codes). These are: NACE rev. 1 codes 7221 -software publishing, 3002 -manufacturing of computers and other information processing equipment, 322 -manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy, 323 -manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods. These codes identify companies producing both software and hardware. For simplicity, we refer to the firms in this sample as 'ICT firms'. 8 We reached this number after removing double entries of companies that are no longer in business and of companies whose main activity is not ICT-related, for example, because FAME reported wrong or outdated NACE codes. 9 More precisely, the 38 interviews were conducted with 12 CEOs/Directors/Owners, 9 R&D Managers/Chief Technology Officers/Heads of Operations, 10 IP Managers and 7 people in other positions.
technology). For each type of IP, the respondents were asked to consider different governance forms, as detailed in Table 2 . Releasing not patented product or process innovations to the public Releasing not patented product or process innovations to private firms Using not patented product or process innovations Collaborating with universities without patent restrictions A first set of questions referred to the extent and intensity with which firms participate in each form of IP exchange and in each governance form. Firms were asked about their stock of patents owned and licensed, whether they engaged in each type of patent governance, and if so the number of transactions in the last two years.
With respect to open source, non-patented technology and copyright, firms were asked whether they engaged in each governance form, and if so the number of transactions they realized in the last two years.
A second set of questions referred to the strategic benefits sought when trading IP. For each type of IP and each governance form, firms were asked to choose up to five strategic benefits that they considered important, selecting them from a list of 13 benefits, which can be divided into four broad categories, as listed in Table 3 (identified on the basis of a review of the patent literature, as discussed in section 2). 10 In order to construct the % shares presented in Table 4 , the firms' responses given with respect to each benefit and each governance form were aggregated into the four main categories ('finance', 'innovation', 'strategic relationships', 'market/competitive positioning') for each of the four forms of IP identified in (Kuan, 2001 ), especially when user-driven (Bessen, 2002) . The importance of standardization and compatibility, which allow firms to enlarge their user bases, has also been noticed (Wichmann, 2002a and 2002b) .
Most firms that exchange patents also seek benefits relating to financial gain, competitive positioning, and the building of strategic relationships. In the case of copyright, financial gain is indeed the most important benefit sought, followed by innovation and competitive positioning. When exchanging the two non-proprietary forms of IP, the second most important categories of benefits, after innovation, concern the building of strategic relationships and competitive positioning. (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003) especially when the technology is not crucial to the firm's competitive advantage (Henkel, 2002) .
In terms of competitive positioning, 62% of firms that exchange patents do so in order to gain market share. Since competitive positioning is also sought by 43% of firms that engage in open source (and by 26% of firms that exchange non-patented innovations), this suggests that ICT firms do not attribute exclusive importance to the acquisition of patents as a means to prevent imitation and hence maintain market share: the importance of accessing a wider user base by developing compatible technologies probably plays an important role in market strategies. This is consistent with findings from the literature, which point to the importance to factors other than patent protection, such as lead time and secrecy, to improve market positioning (Levin et al, 1987) . Engagement in non-proprietary IP also allows firms to gain professional or brand recognition.
In sum, three patterns stand out. First, while conventional economic theory suggests that proprietary IP protection is necessary to generate income from innovation and therefore to induce firms to invest in R&D (i.e. costly innovation processes) (Arrow, 1962) , the responses from our set of ICT firms suggest that all forms of IP (not only proprietary ones) provide firms with benefits related to financial gains. Second, while it is often thought that IPRs are necessary in order to create markets for technology that can enter into other firms' innovation processes, we find that greater shares of firms that seek innovation related benefits do so from engaging 
The strategic advantages of different IP governance forms
We now move on to discuss the role of governance structures in the value seeking process through IP transactions.
In the three years previous to the survey, firms have engaged in a much higher number of IP transactions involving non-proprietary rather than proprietary IP. On We find that the 28 ICT firms active in our selected IP markets are engaged in a variety of governance forms for IP transactions, often at the same time.
Of the 13 firms that exchange patents, most out-license (9 firms, or 69%) and in-license (10, or 77%) patents; 7 (54%) engage in cross-patenting and/or in buying patents, and 5 (39%) in selling patents. Only 3 (23%) participate in patent pools. 9 firms exchange copyright; of these, 5 (56%) buy copyright, 4 (44%) sell copyright, 3 33%) out-license it and 2 (22%) in-license it. Only 3 firms in-license university patents (23%), 1 (8%) buys university patents, 1 (8%) buys and in-licenses university copyright. We thus find that patented university knowledge is not a key strategy to our set of ICT firms. This is consistent with the results of other investigations with respect to the software industry (see e.g. Cohen et al, 2002) . Due to the particularly small number of firms that engage in the transaction of university IP, in the rest of the article we do not consider these governance forms.
With respect to non-proprietary IP, all the 14 firms that engage in open source do so in software (100%), and 6 of them (43%) also participate in other open source communities. Of the 19 firms that exchange non-patented technology, 7 (37%) release technology to the public, 11 (58%) release non-patented technology to private firms, 13 (68%) use non-patented technology, and 6 (32%) collaborate with universities with no patent restrictions. Building upon Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) , we hypothesized that, for each type of IP, there is a link between the governance form in which firms engage and the benefits that they seek. That is, benefits are not only specific to certain types of IP (as identified in section 4.1), but also to particular IP governance forms.
To address this issue, we build an index that measures the extent to which organizations that take part in a certain governance form 'specialize' in seeking a certain benefit, relative to the overall importance of this benefit. Because this index is constructed exactly as the widely used Revealed Technological Advantage index and
Revealed Comparative Advantage index, we refer to it as the index of 'Revealed Governance Advantage' (RGA) 12 .
Let x ij be the number of times that benefit i is chosen in governance form j, and ∑ i x ij the number of times that all benefits are chosen in governance form j; let ∑ j x ij be the number of times that benefit i is chosen in all governance forms, and ∑ i ∑ j x ij the total number of benefits chosen in all governance forms (that is, the index is the ratio between the share of benefit i in governance form j and the share of benefit i in all governance forms). Then, for a certain governance form, the revealed governance advantage index is:
This index allows us to compare the relative advantage of the various governance forms in allowing firms to reach certain benefits. It only assumes positive values: a value that is smaller than 1 indicates that governance form j is relatively under-specialized in benefit i, while a value greater than 1 indicates that governance form j is relatively over-specialized in that benefit.
The same index can be computed at the level of overall types of IP markets. The 'Revealed IP Market Advantage' index (which measures the extent to which organizations that engage in a certain type of IP markets 'specialize' in seeking a certain benefit, relative to the overall importance of this benefit) is computed as
where y ij is the number of times that benefit i is chosen when exchanging IP j, ∑ i y ij the number of times that all benefits are chosen when exchanging IP j, ∑ j y ij is the number of times that benefit i is chosen when exchanging all types of IP, and ∑ i ∑ j y ij is the total number of benefits chosen when exchanging all types of IP (that is, the 12 The RGA for a specific strategic benefit is constructed in a similar way to the Revealed Technological Advantages (RTA) index (first developed and used in patent statistics by Keith Pavitt and John Cantwell) and the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, which is an index (first developed and used in international economics by Bela Balassa) for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of goods or services as evidenced by trade flows.
index is the ratio between the share of benefit i for IP j and the share of benefit i for all types of IP).
This index allows us to compare the relative advantage of the various types of IP in allowing firms to reach certain benefits 13 . We first consider proprietary IP. The values of the RGA index in Table 6 show that financial gains are particularly sought when selling, out-licensing and crosslicensing patents or copyright, probably since these transactions provide firms with direct income. This supports the results from Mann (2005) , which highlight that some firms in the software industry obtain substantial amounts of revenue through licensing. Innovation benefits are particularly sought when buying and in-licensing patents and copyright, since these activities allow firms to use the best innovations.
We find that firms improve their competitive position particularly by in-licensing and buying patents -which grants them exclusive access to certain technologies, and sometimes allows them to control the overall production process and take advantage of economies of scale (Reitzig, 2004 When we consider non-proprietary IP, we find that releasing non-patented technology to the public allows firms to improve their market position, confirming the importance, in the ICT industry, to build a base of users. This shows the importance of other factors other than patent protection in improving market positioning (Levin et al, 1987) .
Innovation benefits are mainly sought when using non-patented technology, which give firms access to the best innovations. Firms particularly use collaborations with universities in order to build strategic relationships and to gain financially, deriving income and saving on IP protection costs. With respect to the IP markets, the values of the RMA index (also displayed in Table 6 ) show that firms particularly seek benefits relating to innovation and the building of strategic relationships when they engage in open source, financial gains when they engage in copyright, and competitive positioning benefits when they engage in patents.
In order to quantify the strength of the results (i.e. the extent to which a certain benefit is specific to one or a few governance forms, or whether it is equally sought in different governance forms) we compute the coefficient of variation of the RGA index across the governance forms ( RGA /µ RGA ·100%). Similarly, we quantify the extent to which a benefit is specific to a certain type of IP markets by computing the coefficient of variation of the RMA index across types of IP markets ( RMA /µ RMA ·100%). The higher the coefficient of variation, the more a certain benefit is specific to one or few governance forms, or to a certain type of IP market, so the stronger is the revealed advantage. The results in Table 7 show that, in the case of proprietary IP, all benefits are very specific to certain governance forms (the standard deviation of the RGA index is 
Conclusions
The analysis of the intensity and the strategic reasons for which UK-based ICT firms 
